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Background: Physician dual practice, a combination of public and private practice, has attracted attention due to
fear of reduced work supply and a lack of key personnel in the public system, increase in low priority treatments,
and conflicts of interest for physicians who may be competing for their own patients when working for private
suppliers. In this article, we analyze both choice of dual practice among hospital physicians and the dual practices’
effect on work supply in public hospitals.
Methods: The sample consisted of 12,399 Norwegian hospital physicians working in public hospitals between 2001
and 2009. We linked hospital registry data on salaries and hospital working hours with data from national income
and other registries covering non-hospital income, including income from dual work, cohabiting status, childbirths
and socioeconomic characteristics. Our dataset also included hospital variables describing i.e. workload. We
estimated odds ratio for choosing dual practice and the effects of dual practice on public working hours using
different versions of mixed models.
Results: The percentage of physicians engaged in dual practice fell from 35.1% for men and 17.6% for women in
2001 to 25.0% and 14.2%, respectively, in 2009. For both genders, financial debt and interest payments were
positively correlated and having a newborn baby was negatively correlated with engaging in dual practice. Larger
family size and being cohabitating increased the odds ratio of dual practice among men but reduced it for women.
The most significant internal hospital factor for choosing dual practice was high wages for extended working hours,
which significantly reduced the odds ratio for dual practice. The total working hours in public hospitals were similar
for both those who did and did not engage in dual practice; however, dual practice reduced public working hours
in some specialties.
Conclusion: Economic factors followed by family variables are significant elements influencing dual practice.
Although our findings indicate that engagement in dual practice by public hospital physicians in a well-regulated
market may increase the total labor supply, this may vary significantly between medical specialties.
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In health care systems that include both public and pri-
vate providers, there may be competition for the recruit-
ment of health care workers. Physicians who engage in
‘dual practice’ by working for both public and private
care providers have attracted particular attention. Po-
tential challenges described by the literature include re-
duced work supply and a lack of key personnel in the
public system, an increase in low priority treatments,
and conflicts of interest for physicians who may be com-
peting for their own patients when working for private
suppliers [1-6]. One theoretical model has predicted that
reduced total health care delivery will result from phy-
sician dual practice [6]. Such hypotheses need to be em-
pirically tested.
Physician dual practice is a term used to cover several
differing aspects: physicians who combine work in the
public system with work for private health care pro-
viders, education, research, management, or other eco-
nomic activities not associated with health. In this paper,
physician dual practice refers to physicians employed in
public hospitals who also work in other types of health
services, including ambulant emergency care where they
substitute for private GPs (moonlighting), private not-
for-profit hospitals or private for-profit hospitals and
other providers.
Several reasons for dual practice have been suggested:
a wide gap between physicians’ income expectations and
wages in the public systems, long waiting lists and unsat-
isfactory working conditions in the public system, and
other factors reflecting individual choices [1-3,7-16]. The
reasons for dual practice may be quite diverse at the in-
dividual level, and an analysis of dual practice should
recognize that individual employees might have quite
different expectations and personal career goals.
Many of the empirical studies on this issue have been
performed in countries with rather low public health
salaries, and these studies may not reflect the situation
in more developed countries where public salaries may
be more competitive [16-20]. One of these studies [16]
provided some support for the use of “rewarding” pol-
icies to retain physicians in the public sectors of more
developed countries, while “limiting” policies are recom-
mended for developing countries.
The Norwegian health system is mainly funded by
general taxation. This also holds for the private sector,
which consists of nonprofit hospitals with a well-defined
catchment area, private for-profit hospitals specializing
in day surgery, and specialists on contracts with regional
health authorities. As a rule, GPs are organized as pri-
vate practitioners on contract to municipalities. Private
for-profit institutions also treat patients who pay out of
pocket for their own care or are covered by voluntary
health insurance.There are no regulations in place that prohibit public
employees from combining positions in public and pri-
vate health care. In 1996, to possibly tackle a brain drain
from public to private hospitals, a targeted increase in
salaries for extended working hours and overtime work
resulted in a substantial salary increase for physicians
working in public hospitals. A study of that event in-
dicated that the salary increase of 11% increased the
physician labor supply to public hospitals and reduced
physician dual practice [7]. Today, health care salaries in
Norway compare favorably with salaries in the rest of
the labor market, and per capita health care expenditure
is among the highest in Europe [21].
A major reform in the Norwegian hospital sector was
introduced in 2002, when all public hospitals in Norway
were transferred from a system of county ownership to
central government ownership [22]. Hospitals were
restructured as health enterprises comprising 1–8 hospital
units and organized within five regional health authorities
(RHAs). In 2005, the number of RHAs was reduced from
five to four. In the study period, the Norwegian hospital
sector consisted of five regional university hospital enter-
prises (specialized hospitals), twelve central hospital enter-
prises (two with university functions), and eight local
hospital enterprises. Regional hospitals, and to a certain
degree central hospitals, use a substantial amount of their
resources for research, whereas local hospitals mainly
focus on patient care. Theoretically, this may influence
both the workload and attractiveness of the institution.
The aim of the 2002 hospital reform was to increase hos-
pital efficiency by providing greater autonomy with re-
spect to planning, budgeting, and workforce policies, and
to ensure a more precise definition of their economic
responsibilities. The reform occurred during a period in
which private providers were building up their capacity
in response to increasing waiting lists and waiting times.
In 2002, the political signal was that RHAs should in-
crease their use of private suppliers of specialist health
care services to reduce increasing waiting lists. However,
in 2005, a center-left coalition government announced its
aim to reduce the use of private health care service pro-
viders. This resulted in a decrease in contracts between
the RHAs’ and private suppliers.Aim and objectives
The aims of the current study are twofold. We first exa-
mine those factors that affect a physician’s decision to
engage in dual practice. Second, we analyze how the en-
gagement in dual practice affects the number of weekly
working hours in public hospitals. We implement the ana-
lysis using a general model of physician labor supply
where socioeconomic factors such as income and family
structure and hospital specific factors such as physicians’
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working hours in public hospitals.
Methods
Study group
All 18,888 physicians who held a position in Norwegian
public hospitals between 2001 and 2009 were considered
for the study. We included physicians that had worked at
least two years in public hospitals following graduation.
To work as an independent physician in the private sector
(and thus engage in dual practice), it is mandatory to be
fully licensed as doctor, and this requires 18 months of
intern service. Because of a lack of socioeconomic data,
we excluded physicians who did not have a Norwegian so-
cial security number (usually short-term workers and
those with incomplete data in public databases of social
factors). Physicians above 67 years (the pension age) are
excluded from the analyses. Using these criteria, the num-
ber of physicians in our sample ranged from 6,820 phy-
sicians in 2001 to 9,808 in 2009. In total, our sample
consisted of 12,399 individual physicians.
Data sources
We linked data from three different registers. Data of
salaries and hospital working hours for each physician
in each year (2001–2009) were obtained from The
Employers Organization Specter, which annually reports
such data to Statistics Norway. Data regarding nonhospital
income and individual characteristics as cohabiting status
and number of children were obtained for each physician
in each year from Statistics Norway. To combine these
two data sets we transferred the individual physician data
from the Specter database to Statistics Norway, which
linked the data and returned them as anonymous code.
Activity data for both the public hospitals and private
providers consist of the total number of annual DRG ac-
tivity for hospital stays, day treatments, and outpatient
treatments. We recorded mean waiting times within
each hospital region as variables reflecting the excess
health care demand.
According to Norwegian regulations, the study did
not require approval by The Norwegian Data Protection
Authority or The Regional Committees for Medical and
Health Research Ethics, but the study was subject to no-
tification as required under the Norwegian Personal
Data Act. Notification was submitted to the Norwegian
Social Science Data Services (NSD) on 5 May 2008
(project number 19192).
Variable definitions
We defined the two dependent variables as follows:
– Dual practice: In Norway, all income from all
sources is registered annually for each individual.Nonhospital income is classified by Statistics
Norway into the following categories: finance,
teaching, moonlighting in primary care, salary from
private health care, consulting/administrative work
outside public hospitals, and salary from other
nonhospital public service. Dual practice was
described by a dummy variable taking the value of 1
if the physician received income as an individual
person or as a private entrepreneur from
moonlighting, private not-for-profit or private
for-profit health care providers, and the value of 0
for all others.
– Total weekly working hours: the wage system for
hospital physicians defines the standard basic weekly
working hours to be 35.5–40.0 hours, which are
fairly constant over time. In addition, doctors may
voluntarily work extended hours each week on a
regular basis (negotiated individually) and typically
varying from 0 to 10 hours per week. Although
these hours are usually stable over time, we
recorded this variable each year for each individual
physician. These two components make up the total
planned working hours per week for each physician.
Total weekly working hours also include casual
overtime work, which may have monthly variations.
Total weekly working hours describe the average
total labor supply each week across the year.
The salary for extended working hours is based on
national regulations and is calculated as 0.08% of the indi-
vidual’s total regular annual salary. The hourly wage is re-
lated to position, experience, and education (e.g., PhD),
and amounts to approximately twice the basic hourly
wage. Individual attributes are described by the follo-
wing variables; Age, Gender (men = 0, women = 1), being
cohabitating (single, including divorced and widowed = 0,
married, including formal partnerships according to
Norwegian law = 1), Children < 18 years (number of chil-
dren under 18 years) and a dummy variable, ChildLast-
Year, indicating whether the individual had a child born
(no child = 0, child born = 1) the previous year. Based on
earlier analyses of significant gender effects on labor sup-
ply [23], we also analyzed the effects of gender on dual
practice and therefore included interaction terms between
gender and Children < 18 years, ChildLastYear, and co-
habiting status.
As indicated in the Background Section, previous re-
ports have suggested that hospital characteristics may
affect physicians’ decisions to engage in work in the pri-
vate sector [7], and we therefore included hospital-
specific variables. As an indicator of the workload (Work
Load), we used the total number of diagnosis-related
group (DRG) equivalents (the sum of DRG weights) per
year from hospitalized patients and day treatment and
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Figure 1 Percentage of male and female physicians engaged in
dual practice, 2001–2009.
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beds to obtain the total DRG activity per hospital bed
for each year. As a further indication of staffing, we cal-
culated the number of FTE nurses and FTE physicians
per hospital bed.
Individual-level economic data from Statistics Norway
included total taxable income, total debt, total interest
costs for loans, total income from savings, and income
from nonhospital activity for each year. We calculated
the net capital income (NetCapInc) as the sum of inter-
est from savings and from total debt.
Analytical approach and statistics
Between group analyses were done by Wilcoxon two-
sample test.
The odds ratio of engaging in dual practice was analyzed
using Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) with a
binary response distribution and a logit link function. We
used fixed effects for hospital and specialty to control for
differences between specialties in some of the specifica-
tions. The statistical set up is inspired by previous eco-
nomic analyses of physicians’ labor supply including those
of Sloan, Noether, Rizzo and Blumenthal, and Baltagi et al.
[24-27]. Our estimated models were derived from the life-
cycle model and account for former income from work
and capital by including lagged versions (values from pre-
vious year) of these variables. The regression equation of
Dual practice (footprints for time are suppressed):
Dual practice ¼ aþ a1Salary for extended working hours lagð Þ
þa2NetCapInc lagð Þ þ a3IndAtt þ a4Hosp
þa5Waiting time þ uhe þ yþ spþ e
where NetCapInc is the sum of capital income and ex-
penses, IndAtt refers to individual characteristics such as
gender, age, and cohabitating status. Age is categorized as
follows: Age group1 < 35 years, 35 < = age group 2 < 45,
45 < = age group 3 < 55, 55 < = age group 4 < 68. Age
group 4 serves as reference category. Hosp refers to hos-
pital characteristics as Workload, FTE physicians and
Nurses per bed. We included dummies (fixed effects) that
were specific to each health enterprise (uhe), year (y), and
specialty (sp).
The regression equation for total weekly working
hours:
Total Weekly Working Hours ¼ bþ b1Salary for extended working hours lagð Þ
þb2NetCapInc lagð Þ þ b3IndAtt þ b4Hosp
þDualPracticeþ uhe þ yþ spþ e;
where DualPractice describes whether the physician
has dual practice or not (dual practice = 1, no dual prac-
tice = 0).
The fixed-effects analyses imply that we utilized the vari-
ation between individuals within each health enterprise,
year, and specialty. We assumed all remaining errors to be
white noise (e). Dummies for health enterprises will, forexample, capture the effect of the hospital hierarchy. We
analyzed the dataset as unbalanced.
We used SAS software version 12.4 (SAS Institute,
Cary, NC).
Results
Dual practice
During the study period, twice as many men as women
performed dual practice. There was a steady decline in
the percentage who engaged in dual practice, from
35.1% of male physicians and 17.6% of female in 2001 to
25.0% and 14.2% in 2009, respectively (Figure 1).
The incomes from dual practice varied considerably
between the specialties; incomes from dual practice are
illustrated as a percentage of physicians’ total income in
some of the specialties with the highest dual practice
payments in Figure 2. Only physicians with income from
dual practice are included. The figure illustrates that
otolaryngology and ophthalmology stand out with espe-
cially high relative payments, being approximately twice
the level of the other specialties. The incomes from dual
practice for those engaging in such practices increases at
the same time as the share of physicians in dual practice
are reduced (Figure 1 and Figure 2). Further descriptive
statistics are given in Table 1.
Odds ratio for choosing dual practice
Females (Gender) had a significantly lower odds ratio for
choosing dual practice (p < 0.001) in all our analyses
(Table 2). Having a child born last year reduced the odds
ratio for both genders, although it was strongest for
females. Being cohabiting and having a higher number of
younger family members increased the odds ratio for
men, but was negative for women. More debt and interest
costs (negative values of net capital income) increased the
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Figure 2 Earnings from dual practice as a percentage of physicians’ total annual income in selected specialties.
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genders. In the fixed effect analysis, senior consultants
had a slightly higher odds ratio for dual practice than resi-
dents, and dual practice was highest in the oldest phy-
sician age group.
The most striking hospital variable that correlated to
the choice of dual practice was the wage level for extendedTable 1 Descriptive statistics for the study groups with and w
Without dual practice
Variable Median Maximum Minimum
Age 43 77 24
Total debt 771 751 28 633 481 0
Net capital income -35 026 9 455 296 -7 042 82
Percent females 44.6%
Percent of group who is cohabiting 76%
Number of children < 18 years (mean) 1 9 0
Child born last year (mean) 0.07 1 0
Average of full time equivalent 100 120 20
Mean extended hours/week 5.6 74.9 0
Average overtime hours/week 2.2 36.0 0
Total working hours 44.2 96.58 0
Median age in age group 1 32
Median age in age group 2 39
Median age in age group 3 49
Median age in age group 3 59
DRG per hospital bed 109 186 54
FTE physicians per hospital bed 0.62 1.11 0.17
FTE nurses per hospital bed 1.9 4.4 2.0
Regional waiting time for patients 62 103 47work in the public hospitals, which reduced the odds ratio
significantly.
From 2005 to 2007, the mean waiting times increased
by 10%–35% in the differing regions. However, the extent
of dual practice fell in the same period and there were no
correlation between waiting times and odds ratio for dual
practice in the multivariate analysis. We experimentedithout dual practice
With dual practice P-val nondual versus dual
Median Maximum Minimum
45 74 24
1 123 071 27 643 218 0 <0.01
7 -52 606 9 972 644 -3 912 604 <0.01
25.3% <0.01
87% <0.01
1 7 0
0.05 1 0 <0.01
100 100 20
5.6 70 0
2.0 31.52 0
44.1 90 0
31
40
49
59
108 186 29
0.61 1.11 0.3
1.9 4.4 2.0
56 103 47
Table 2 Engagement in dual practice 2001-2009 (Odds Ratio with 95% Confidence Interval)
Model 1 Model 2
Odds ratio Confidence interval Odds ratio Confidence interval
Salary for extended work hours (lag) 0.999 0.999 - 0.999 1.000 0.999 - 1.000
Net capital income (lag) ( 10 000 NOK) 0.963 0.961 - 0.966 0.964 0.961 - 0.967
Gender (female=1) 0.697 0.652 - 0.744 0.697 0.652 - 0.746
Cohabiting 1.074 1.024 - 1.128 1.112 1.058 - 1.168
Cohabiting by gender 0.710 0.653 - 0.772 0.681 0.626 - 0.741
Number of children<18 1.007 0.987 - 1.028 1.015 0.995 - 1.037
Number of children<18 by gender 0.883 0.853 - 0.915 0.879 0.848 - 0.911
ChildLastYear 0.877 0.797 - 0.965 0.878 0.796 - 0.968
ChildLastYear by gender 0.571 0.479 - 0.682 0.562 0.470 - 0.672
Age group 1 1.016 0.941 - 1.098 0.938 0.867 - 1.016
Age group 2 0.667 0.626 - 0.711 0.646 0.605 - 0.689
Age group 3 0.952 0.901 - 1.006 0.937 0.885 - 0.991
Work load 1.113 1.006 - 1.232 0.962 0.789 - 1.174
Physician group 0.991 0.937 - 1.048 1.081 1.019 -1.147
Intercept 0.343 0.291 - 0.404 0.073 0.055 - 0.095
Year (fixed effects) Yes Yes
Specialty (fixed effects) No Yes
Health enterprises (fixed effects) No Yes
Akaike [28] information criterion 75039.35 72885.15
Pearson’s Chi-Square 67842.09 67717.30
N 12399 12399
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as forward stepwise analyses (‘smaller is better’). Staffing
indicators (physicians and nurses per bed) and waiting
lists did not correlate to the odds ratio. An apparent in-
creasing effect on the odds ratio of DRG per hospital bed
was eliminated when using fixed effect analysis (Table 2).
Working hours in public hospitals
Annual mean planned working hours, the mean number
of overtime hours and hours on call (data not shown)
in public hospitals were similar between groups with
and without dual practice in the bivariate comparisons
(Figure 3). Accordingly, total working hours per year were
also similar. This was also confirmed in the regression
analyses where engaging in dual practice did not reduce
total working hours (Table 3).
The wage coefficients were negative but close to zero,
indicating that the general wage increases over time had
no effects on the labor supply in the period analyzed. As
already indicated, there were no general significant ef-
fects of dual practices and total weekly working hours in
public hospitals. However, separate analyses for oto-
laryngology and ophthalmology, the two specialties with
the highest levels of non-public income, revealed a
stronger relationship between dual practice and workinghours in public hospitals, with estimates in the range of
3–5 fewer hours a week in both specialties. There were
no significant interaction effects between dual practice
and gender (estimates not shown), indicating that dual
practice affects the labor supply in public hospitals simi-
larly in both genders.
Further effects are in line with former analyses [23].
Women worked fewer hours than men did. After con-
trolling for other variables, the effect was approximately
0.88 hours per week. The effects of children diverged
strongly between the genders. In general, a child born
last year increased the working hours among male phy-
sicians and substantially reduced it among females.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this register-based study of 12,399
physicians in Norway is one of the largest to investigate
physician engagement in dual practice in a fairly sys-
tematic setting including both genders. Furthermore,
our study period of nine years seems to be one of the
longest.
We found that approximately twice as many men as
women participated in dual practice. Our study was con-
ducted within a system that has not banned or regulated
dual practice. Nevertheless, the proportion of physicians
a b
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Figure 3 Mean planned working hours (a) and mean overtime hours per week (b) among physicians with and without dual practice
(2001–2009).
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during the study period. The reason for this may be re-
lated to several factors. First, increasing hourly rate for
extended working hours in hospitals reduced the odds
ratio for engagement in dual practice significantly. This
salary rate was instituted in 1996 specifically to increase
physicians’ willingness to work extended hours to ensure
a sufficient labor force in hospitals. Our findings mayTable 3 Total weekly working hours in public hospitals
Model 1
Estimate Con
Salary for extended work hours (lag) -0.002 -
Net capital income (lag) (NOK 10 000) -0.026 -
Gender (female=1) -1.133 -
Cohabiting -0.441 -
Cohabiting by gender -0.584 -
Number of children <18 -0.254 -
Number of children <18 by gender -0.364 -
ChildLastYear 0.688
ChildLastYear by gender -1.710 -
Age group 1 4.602
Age group 2 1.811
Age group 3 1.190
DRG per hospital bed 1.831
Dual practice -0.159 -
Physician group -2.650 -
Intercept -2.650 -
Year (fixed effects) Yes
Specialty (fixed effects) No
Health enterprises (fixed effects) No
Akaike [28] information criterion 470679.5
N 12399indicate that the effect of this action has been successful
and is lasting over time. It supports the findings
reported in other Norwegian studies [7,29]. Further-
more, the general regulations reducing the hours of
work of Norwegians in recent decades may also be of
significance.
Our analyses indicated that dual workers overall pro-
vided a similar labor supply to public hospitals as theirModel 2
fidence interval Estimate Confidence interval
0.002 - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 - 0.000
0.036 - -0.015 -0.033 -0.043 - -0.023
1.356 - -0.910 -0.885 -1.104 - -0.667
0.618 - -0.265 -0.262 -0.435 - -0.090
0.853 - -0.315 -0.432 -0.694 - -0.170
0.328 - -0.181 -0.263 -0.334 - -0.191
0.473 - -0.255 -0.399 -0.505 - -0.292
0.342 - 1.035 0.784 0.447 - 1.121
2.204 - -1.216 -2.077 -2.558 - -1.597
4.339 - 4.865 4.101 3.838 - 4.364
1.594 - 2.028 1.948 1.731 - 2.164
0.993 - 1.386 1.251 1.054 - 1.447
1.482 - 2.179 1.157 0.508 - 1.806
0.297 - -0.021 -0.126 -0.262 - 0.010
2.833 - -2.467 -1.933 -2.117 - -1.749
2.833 - -2.467 -1.933 -2.117 - -1.749
Yes
Yes
Yes
466800.6
12399
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working hours, on call duties, and overtime work. Thus,
although our results may seem to contradict the hypo-
thesis that dual workers reduce their public labor supply
and avoid engagement in variable work and overtime
[6,18], they are in accordance with previous British and
Danish studies [9,30]. In fact, in our study, physicians
engaged in dual work seemed to provide more than their
fair share of the physician labor supply, which has also
been suggested in other reports [3,9,10,20,30].
However, in particular specialties such as otolaryn-
gology and ophthalmology, we found significant higher
dual work incomes than in other specialties, and in these
fields, the dual workers definitely worked less in the
hospitals than their non-dual working colleagues. This
significant variation between differing specialties may be
associated with several facts. Our main hypothesis, how-
ever, is that financing for private services in these two
specialties has been particularly abundant. This was in-
stituted long before our study period as a governmental
response to persistently long waiting lists for these pa-
tient groups over the decades.
Individual attributes influencing choice of dual practice
Economic factors seem to be one of the most important
motives for choosing to engage in dual practice, even in
a well-salaried system as found in Norway. The dual
practitioners had higher levels of debt and thus more
negative net capital income than their non-dual prac-
ticing colleagues did, and this was the most important
correlation after gender and children. Our finding that
having a child in the last year significantly reduced dual
practice for females is not surprising as childbirth, for
obvious reasons, has a larger impact on the lives of
women than men. Furthermore, the finding that having
a larger family size has a greater negative impact on dual
practice for women probably indicates that domestic du-
ties are still largely considered to be the responsibility of
women.
Our observation of a considerable variation in the
extent of dual practice that paralleled the changes in pri-
vate services between 2001 and 2009 may indicate that
dual practice may be influenced by health marked condi-
tions (Figure 4). The finding of higher odds ratio among
the consultant and senior physicians is as expected, as
there are more specialists among those holding these po-
sitions. The significance of the slightly higher odds ratio
in the age group above 55 years is unclear, but needs fur-
ther investigation.
Previous reports have indicated that unfavorable hos-
pital characteristics may contribute to physicians choos-
ing dual practice [7-11]. Several of these studies focused
on special medical fields. In our study, higher levels of
physician or nurse staffing per hospital bed did notinfluence the odds ratio to choose dual practice. One in-
terpretation may be that the effects of such hospital fac-
tors are weak determinants of dual practice in a system
like the Norwegian, where public hospitals have fair con-
ditions regarding equipment, technology and staffing.
Furthermore, such factors may be less important than
economic factors and motives in other health care sys-
tems. Our main conclusion is, however, that factors in-
fluencing dual practice, both individual and hospital
factors, are rather complex and should be analyzed in an
appropriate context and not separately.
Other aspects of dual practice
The literature is rather inconclusive regarding the differ-
ing aspects of dual practice, probably because of a lack
of solid data. Negative implications have been proposed
for general health care costs, the availability of health
services, waiting lists, and the quality of public services
[1,2,13,19,31,32]. Several of these factors are challenged
by our results. Except for two specific specialties, the
dual practitioners in our study worked just as many
hours as their colleagues in public hospitals. Further-
more, the incidence of dual practice fell in the first two
years after the 2005 policy change, even though waiting
times increased. Neither was it found that the substantial
variation in the extent of dual practice in the period was
associated with a corresponding variation in public
working hours. Thus, we find little support for the
theoretical model published in 2007 [6] that claimed a
reduction in total health services due to dual practice.
Several reports have proposed that dual practice should
be restricted and regulated. Such steps have been exer-
cised in several countries, but bans in the form of exclu-
sive public sector contracts have rarely been successful
[2,5,17,33-37]. Intermediate steps have been taken, for
example, in the UK and France, where public specialists
are allowed to earn 10% (UK) or 30% (France) of their
total income from private fees [17,38]. However, a study
from 2003 reported that despite such regulations, National
Health Service consultants on average had a private
income of 26% of their NHS income [5]. Except for oto-
laryngology and ophthalmology, which had average dual
incomes of 35%–45% of the total income in our study, the
other dual practitioners in our study had more moderate
dual earnings of less than 20% of their total incomes
(Figure 2).
There is a wide cross-national heterogeneity in the
extent of dual practice [12]. Furthermore, there is a con-
sensus in the literature that countries with lower public
salaries may be more prone to experience dual practice
than countries where salaries are competitive. Our results
must be considered in the context of a well-resourced
Norwegian public system. In our study, we observed that
less than 30% of physicians engage in dual practice in
a b
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Figure 4 Sum of DRG activity at private hospitals (a), and mean earnings per physician from dual practice (b) (2001–2009. 1 NOK = $6.5
in 2009).
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/299Norway, which is lower than the rate found in most inter-
national studies. It is also lower than previously reported
among Norwegian physicians [7]. This may be because in
Norway, doctors’ public salaries are competitive. This may
indicate that the effect of the salary adjustments made in
1996 has been preserved during follow-up negotiations
for physician salaries, and that such mechanisms work.
In both the EU and US, a significant reduction in work-
ing hours should be expected over time with the imple-
mentation of the European Working Time Directive and
the 2011 Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Education duty hour standard, respectively [39,40]. Whe-
ther this also will influence dual work remains to be seen.a
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Figure 5 (a) Physician specialist’s annual salary, ratio to average salar
salary of specialist doctors and nurses (2008. USD $).Most previous reports have studied dual practice in health
care systems that are quite different to the Norwegian
system, which is a largely publicly financed system charac-
terized by the strong regulation of patient rights and the
labor rights of health care workers. For example, regula-
tions concerning the hours of work of Norwegians have
considerably reduced annual working hours in recent de-
cades. Thus, our Norwegian results may refer to a frame-
work that is somewhat advanced compared with most
other health care systems with respect to lower working
hours and widely available (and desirable) social benefits.
Comparing dual practice across differing national systems
is challenging. It may be argued that our results fromb
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/299Norway (which is a high-cost country with rather high sal-
ary levels as compared with most other European and
Western countries) are influenced by a remunera-
tion system for Norwegian hospital doctors that is too fa-
vorable to be relevant to other health care systems. How-
ever, the compensation received by Norwegian physicians
is not too different from that in other countries when liv-
ing costs and salaries of other workers are considered. Fig-
ure 5 illustrates that physician remuneration compared
with average wages and nurses is no more favorable in
Norway than in other systems [41].
Limitations
Our register-based study did not include individual vari-
ables of motivation, work satisfaction, and career goals.
Therefore, several factors that may influence physicians’
choices to engage in dual practice were not included in
our study.
The criteria for including other income as dual prac-
tice may differ between studies. Whereas we captured all
taxable income from non-public clinical work, this may
vary between countries. We focused on dual medical
practice and did not include income from nonmedical
activities.
Analyzing hospital characteristics across multiple spe-
cialties means sacrificing specificity for breadth, and this
applies to all our hospital variables. DRG equivalents are
not an exact measure of patient-related workload be-
cause they include compensation for non-personnel rou-
tine operating costs attributable to patient care, medical
and technical tools, routine nursing services, and so
on. Furthermore, inpatient and outpatient DRG metrics
must also be pooled with care because inpatient and
outpatient activities consume quite different amounts of
physician labor. In addition, some specialties, such as
pathology and laboratory medicine, are involved in quite
different ways than the specialties related to direct pa-
tient contact. Another issue is that DRG measures do
not reflect research, education, and several other work
duties. We cannot rule out that more specific characte-
ristics of hospitals could have given different regression
results. Nevertheless, DRG measures are the standard
official measures of treatment activity in the annual go-
vernmental reports that assess productivity in Norwegian
hospitals today.
We cannot ignore the fact that more detailed and spe-
cific measures of hospital staffing than we used for nurse
and physician staffing could have given other correlates
to the odds ratio of choosing dual practice, and such
variables should probably be refined.
Conclusions
We conclude that dual practice seems to be strongly related
to economic motives, even in a system with competitivesalaries in the public system, and that it has a dynamic na-
ture that is responsive to the financial incentives offered.
The gender differences that have been previously described
in other workforce-related perspectives also seem to be
reflected in dual practice, with family and socioeconomic
factors as strong determinants, even in a system with well-
developed equity policies. We also conclude that although
dual work does not seem to reduce working hours in the
public system from an overall perspective, it may definitely
influence the public workforce in specific fields of medicine.
The most important corollary therefore seems to be that
care should be taken when making general conclusions re-
garding dual practice based on studies of particular med-
ical fields. And vice versa, conducting studies on a macro
level may miss particular specialties of interest and con-
cern. Our conclusion is that dual practice should be
analyzed in a broad context and not from a narrow per-
spective. Furthermore, there is obviously large diversity
between differing countries and health systems. As health
care delivery in the future may face a substantial work-
force shortfall, it may be argued that the sector cannot af-
ford to lose any kind of labor supply, and in this respect,
policymakers may have to pursue different objectives
depending on the actual health care system. The hetero-
geneity of dual practice suggests that it should not be
debated as a polarized problem between public and pri-
vate health care, but should be evaluated from an ana-
lytical viewpoint and based on facts [22,35,36].
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